8.6.1 - Interference with persons having duties to discharge in a court of justice
Interference with witnesses
It is a contempt of court to intimidate witnesses in a manner likely to deter them from giving evidence or to influence them in their giving of evidence (Farahbakht v Midas Australia Pty Ltd  NSWSC 1322, ).
It need not be established that the witness was actually deterred or influenced (Re B(JA) (an infant)  2 All ER 168).
Interfering with witnesses is a criminal contempt. The Court will not allow witnesses to be intimidated in any way, either before the trial, pending trial or after trial (Moore v Clerk of Assize, Bristol  1 WLR 1669; Farahbakht v Midas Australia Pty Ltd  NSWSC 1322, ).
It is also a contempt to punish a witness for having testified notwithstanding that the trial has concluded (Attorney-General v Butterworth; In the matter of Goldman  3 NSWR 325). See ‘Reprisals’ below for more information.
For the conduct to constitute contempt, it must be established that the alleged contemnor had some appreciation that the person to whom the conduct in question is directed was a witness or potential witness (Gregory v Philip Morris Ltd (1987) 74 ALR 300).
The following conduct may constitute contempt by interfering with a witness:
to assault, threaten or abuse a witness or potential witness (European Asian Bank AG v Wentworth  5 NSWLR 445);
to prevent a witness from receiving a subpoena (Lane v Registrar of Supreme Court of New South Wales (1981) 148 CLR 245);
to attempt to induce a witness to confess that she had committed perjury at a trial while an appeal is pending (Jones v Jones (1898) 19 LR (NSW) 43);
to threaten a witness with a perjury charge if the witness gives evidence as intended (R v McLachlan  2 VR 55);
to seek to influence a witness against a party by disparagement of that party, or to otherwise prejudge the case (Welby v Still (1892) 8 TLR 202);
to arrest a witness on the way to or while attending the court to give evidence, or otherwise prevent a witness duly summoned from attending court (Hall (1776) 2 Black W 1110; 96 ER 655);
to bribe or attempt to bribe a witness (Lewis v James (1887) 3 TLR 527);
to remove a person from office because of evidence given (Attorney-General v Butterworth  1 QB 696); and
for a landlord to give a tenant notice to quit because the tenant had given evidence against him or her (Chapman v Honig  2 QB 502).
There are two views as to what constitutes the requisite intent for interfering with a witness (Attorney-General v Butterworth  1 QB 696):
The first view is that the alleged contemnor must have intended to deter a witness from giving evidence, or have intended to influence a witness to give evidence in a manner that they would not otherwise have given.
In R v Taylor  3 VR 657, Gobbo J held that he was not satisfied that the alleged contemnor had “the necessary intention to interfere with the course of justice (). His Honour considered but did not decide whether a more lenient standard of being reckless as to the likely consequences of one’s actions would suffice.
The second view is that the alleged contemnor need not have had an intention to interfere with the course of justice, so long as their conduct was inherently likely to interfere.
Recent cases in Victoria (R v McLachlan  2 VR 55) and New South Wales (Farahbakht v Midas Pty Ltd  NSWSC 1322, ) have adopted this second view.
Interference with jurors
An attempt to interfere with a juror is a serious contempt (In re Dunn  VLR 493; Owen  3 All ER 239; Goult (1982) 76 Cr App R 140; Giscombe (1983) 79 Cr App R 79).
The Juries Act 2000 (Vic) s 89 also preserves the crime of embracery.
Interference with a juror may occur while a juror is discharging his or her duty, whilst he or she is travelling to and from the court, and even after the case has been completed and the juror has returned home (Ex parte Pater (1864) 5 B&S 299; 122 ER 842; In re Johnson (1887) 20 QBD 68; Martin (1848) 5 Cox CC 356; Lovelady (1981) 5 A Crim R 197).
The following are examples of where an interference with jurors has been found to be a contempt of court:
The distribution of pamphlets outside the court to jurors or potential jurors seeking to influence their opinion on matters arising in the case before them (Registrar, Court of Appeal v Collins  1 NSWLR 682; Fraser (1984) 15 A Crim R 58; Prothonotary v Collins  2 NSWLR 549).
An employer dismissing or threatening to dismiss an employee because he or she has received or responds to a jury summons, or to instruct him or her not to respond to a jury summons: Lovelady; Drinkwater 4/6/1991 Sup Ct Vic; R v Rogerson (1992) 174 CLR 268.
Writing a letter (the contents of which were untrue) seeking to have an employee excused from jury duty (In the matter of Newton 24/7/1989 Sup Ct Vic).
Interference with judges
Where a person’s conduct has the tendency to intimidate or improperly influence the decision of a judge, that person will be in contempt of court (R v Vasiliou  VSC 216, -).
Last updated: 20 June 2014
8.6 - Acts interfering with the course of justice
8.6.2 - Interference with parties to an action
8.6.3 - Abuse of the court’s process
8.6.4 - Reprisals
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On McGarvie's file LNQ 2015 13008 (? ) he advised the Victorian Government Minister for Counterterrorism & Police that he and his delegates didn't know anything about the FBI & SEC investigations into cases like the bribery between Commonwealth Bank execs and the .T consultant Pulier to people like the Clintons or the smuggling by Ravelo' narcotics ring that smuggled Reserve Bank and Amex and Visa secret economic evidence to Ravelo and Gary Friedman. There should be laws against a government board of officials whose clents say it lent on them and blew whistles on its higher up officials.
Section 323 — Influencing witnesses and jurors
Section 323(a) provides a maximum penalty of seven years for, inter alia, intending to cause a witness in any judicial proceeding to give false evidence, withhold true evidence, not to attend as a witness, or not to produce anything in evidence pursuant to a summons or subpoena. The essence of a s 323(a) offence is that it strikes at the integrity of the justice system and so some form of custodial sentence is normally appropriate: Warby v R (2007) 171 A Crim R 575 at ; R v Burton  NSWCCA 128 at ; Asplund v R (Cth)  NSWCCA 237 at .
Section 323(b) provides a maximum penalty of seven years for intending to influence the conduct of a juror in any judicial proceedings.
Section 324 is an aggravated form of ss 321–323, punishable by a maximum of 14 years, where the offence is committed with the intent of procuring a conviction or acquittal for a “serious indictable offence”.
It is an error to sentence an offender, who pleads guilty to an offence under s 323(a), for the more aggravated offence under s 324. Section 324 “constitutes a distinct and greater offence which must be specifically alleged in the indictment”: Warby v R, above, at .
But, in assessing the objective seriousness of an offence under s 323(a), it is an error to have regard to the absence of a fact which, if it were present, would constitute a different and more serious offence, such as an offence of threatening or intimidating a juror under s 322(a): R v Burton, above, at .
Where an offence under s 323(a) is committed in the context of domestic violence by an offender who wants to dissuade criminally the victim from giving evidence, there is a need for a significant element of general deterrence: R v Burton at . A correct exercise of sentencing discretion required the court to have express regard to the need for general and specific deterrence and denunciation of domestic violence offences: R v Burton at , Hiron v R  NSWCCA 336 at , R v Hamid (2006) 164 A Crim R 179 at . Additionally, given that victims of domestic violence often — and contrary to their interests — forgive their attackers (at ), a court should cautiously approach a victim’s expressions of forgiveness and requests for a lenient sentence: at , .
In Asplund v R (Cth), there was an added element of seriousness to an offence under s 323(a) where the witness influenced by the offender was his 17-year-old son, as such offending had a traumatic effect on the witness and constituted a breach of trust: Asplund v R (Cth) at .
In sentencing for an offence under s 323(b), it is relevant to consider the nature of the intention to influence a juror. In the unusual case of R v Sultan  NSWCCA 461, the applicant approached the husband of a juror during his trial for a break and enter offence. He asked that the juror “listen to the evidence carefully”. Grove J (with Sully and Howie JJ agreeing) accepted that the applicant’s conduct was merely “an exhortation to perform the duty of the juror”: at . Grove J observed at :
The intention of the legislature in enacting s 323(b) was clearly to proscribe any act intended to influence a jury in any way whether benign or not. But it does not derogate from acknowledgement of that intention to assess the seriousness of an offence against the presence or absence of sinister connotation.
See also s 68A Jury Act 1977 below; R v Laws (2000) 50 NSWLR 96.
Section 326 — Reprisals against judges, witnesses, jurors etc
Section 326(1) provides a maximum penalty of 10 years for threatening or causing injury or detriment to a person on account of anything lawfully done as a witness, juror, judicial officer or other public justice official. A similar offence applies where an offender threatens, does or causes injury or detriment believing the person will or may be called as a witness or serve as a juror: s 326(2). It is immaterial whether the accused acted wholly or partly for a reason specified in ss 326(1) or (2): s 326(3).
An offence against s 326 is, by its very nature, serious; amounting to a direct attack upon the administration of justice: Linney v R  NSWCCA 251 at . In Linney v R, the applicant sent emails containing death threats aimed at a judge via the judge’s associate and the police. The court found no error in the sentencing judge’s assessment of the offence as above mid-range: Linney v R at . Although the offence is concerned not only with threatening but also doing or causing injury or detriment, the death threats made by the applicant were repeated, not spontaneous and made in circumstances where the recipient was given real cause to fear they could be carried out: Linney v R at , –.
In R v Jaques  NSWCCA 444, where the applicant made a threat to kill a magistrate, Dowd J (with Wood CJ at CL and Bell J agreeing) explained the gravamen of the offence at :
The offence of course is complete with the uttering of the words, and in the circumstances of the uttering of those words, the finding of guilty by the jury is not a finding of his intention to carry out the threat.
Dowd J continued at –:
His Honour is correct that there is a need for deterrence for this sort of offence. However, in the circumstances of an offence which was not made in the face of the court, which was done in an office where there were other people present, and although it appears it was uttered in anger, it was not such as to clearly indicate an intention to commit the offence that was threatened.
I consider that his Honour has erred in giving too much weight, in the circumstances of the utterance of these remarks, to the severity of what was uttered and has taken into account the applicant’s previous record, and in the circumstances, the penalty is manifestly excessive.
In R v Gaudry; MacDonald  NSWCCA 70 at , the sentencing judge erred by finding the s 326 offences committed by each respondent fell “toward the bottom of the range”. Each respondent threatened a person waiting in the foyer of a courthouse to give evidence. The threat involved reprisals against the person by persons with a reputation for violence. The making of the threat actually interfered with the course of justice by intimidating the person threatened to the effect that he did not give evidence that day: R v Gaudry; MacDonald at .
In Malicki v R  NSWCCA 162, however, the offence contrary to s 326(2) was held to be properly characterised as at the lower end on the basis that Malicki’s criminality was dwarfed by that of the co-offender Widmer: Malicki v R at .
Section 68A Jury Act 1977 — Soliciting information from or harassing jurors or former jurors
It is an offence under s 68A Jury Act 1977 to solicit information from, or harass, a juror or former juror for the purpose of obtaining information about the deliberations of a jury or how a juror, or the jury, formed any opinion or conclusion in relation to an issue arising in the trial (or coronial inquest).
In sentencing the radio presenter John Laws for an offence under s 68A, Wood CJ at CL noted that the increase in maximum penalty from a fine to imprisonment for seven years in 1997 “marks the seriousness with which the Legislature regards intrusion into the sanctity of the jury room”: R v Laws (2000) 50 NSWLR 96 at . Wood CJ at CL imposed a suspended sentence.
[20-170] Perjury, false statements etc: Pt 7 Div 4 Crimes Act 1900; ICAC Act 1988; Police Integrity Commission Act 1996; Crime Commission Act 2012
Part 7 Div 4 Crimes Act provides a range of offences for perjury and false statements. Section 87 of the Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988 (ICAC Act) also provides that a person who, at a compulsory examination or public inquiry conducted by the Commission, gives evidence that is false or misleading in a material particular knowing it to be false or misleading, or not believing it to be true, is guilty of an indictable offence. The maximum penalty for the offence is 200 penalty units or imprisonment for 5 years, or both. Similarly, s 107(1) Police Integrity Commission Act 1996 and s 27(1) Crime Commission Act 2012 provides that a person who, at a hearing before the Commission, gives evidence that is, to the knowledge of the person, false or misleading in a material particular is guilty of an indictable offence. The maximum penalty for an offence under s 107 is the same as the maximum penalty for an offence under s 87 ICAC Act. The text in s 107, “(cf ICAC Act s 87)”, evinces a legislative intention that the sentencer should compare or confer with the false swearing offence created in s 87.
Seriousness of offences
Offences of perjury and false swearing undermine the very foundation of the justice system: R v Aristodemou (unrep, 30/6/94, NSWCCA).
The need for general deterrence is the prime consideration in sentencing for offences of this kind: R v Aristodemou; R v Bulliman (unrep, 25/2/93, NSWCCA).
Any person who commits perjury or false swearing in the course of judicial proceedings or in proceedings such as a Royal Commission or an Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) inquiry should do so in the clear understanding that if their offence is detected, they will go to gaol except in exceptional circumstances: R v Aristodemou; R v Chad (unrep, 13/5/97, NSWCCA); R v Chapman (unrep, 21/5/98, NSWCCA); R v Fish (2002) 131 A Crim R 172 at , ; R v Mahoney  NSWCCA 138 at –.
Motive as relevant factor
An offence of perjury or false swearing will be of lower objective seriousness where it was motivated by threats rather than the offender’s own purposes: R v Pile  NSWCCA 74 at . In that case, the applicant falsely resiled from statements implicating a co-offender in a robbery, but only after he was transferred from protective custody into a cell next to the co-offender.
In R v Fish, the first appellant was a police officer who denied in court that fellow police, including her husband, had assaulted prisoners. The husband had a history of domestic violence towards the appellant. Bell J (with Ipp AJA and Dunford J agreeing) allowed an appeal against sentence. Bell J stated at :
I am persuaded that it was relevant to the question of sentence to take into account the circumstance that the appellant’s offence took place in the context of an abusive marital relationship. This was not simply a matter of a police officer lying in court to protect fellow officers because of a misguided sense of loyalty. The appellant’s case in this respect possessed exceptional features. The reality of her situation was that had she given truthful evidence … she would not only have exposed her husband to liability for his criminal offences but almost certainly she would have been subject to serious physical violence at his hands. These matters raise considerations quite distinct from the need for courts to impose deterrent sentences in cases where police officers lie in order to protect their colleagues.
In R v Yilmaz (unrep, 4/3/91, NSWCCA) Smart J (with Gleeson CJ and Lee CJ at CL agreeing) considered that the applicant’s subjective case was sufficient to justify a non-custodial sentence. The applicant spoke poor English and did not fully understand the consequences of giving false evidence; the false evidence was to no avail; there was considerable delay in finalising the matter. Regarding delay as a mitigating circumstance, see also R v Fifita (unrep, 26/11/92, NSWCCA).
However, in R v Bulliman (unrep, 25/2/93, NSWCCA) Abadee J (with Gleeson CJ and Hunt CJ at CL agreeing) stated:
False evidence strikes at the whole basis of the administration of justice and indeed, it undermines the whole basis of it. Justice inevitably suffers, whatever be the motive for the making of false statements on oath and whatever be the circumstances in which the offence or offences are committed.
In R v Aristodemou (unrep, 30/6/94, NSWCCA) Badgery-Parker J stated:
I do not accept the proposition that the community would regard as in any way a mitigating circumstance that the motive for the applicant’s false swearing was not to conceal corruption on his own part but was to conceal the corrupt conduct of others. No doubt there is an acceptance on the part of those who commit crime that it is dishonourable to inform on others and that there is some nobility in declining to do so. It by no means follows that the same view is taken by right-thinking members of the community and for my part, I refuse to proceed on the assumption that that is so. It is no doubt true that in some circumstances the seriousness of a crime may be seen to be mitigated if it was committed for an honourable, albeit mistaken motive. It is in my view an attempt to press that submission too far if the conduct is such to defeat the purpose of legislation enacted in the public interest.
In R v Mahoney  NSWCCA 138 at , the respondent argued that his perjury was less serious because it involved “a pathetic attempt” to mount a defence to an “overwhelming case”. Shaw J concluded that such a characterisation did not fundamentally detract from the seriousness of the offence.
Similarly, in R v Bulliman (unrep, 25/2/93, NSWCCA), Abadee J (with Gleeson CJ and Hunt CJ at CL agreeing) stated that offenders convicted of perjury “ought to be severely punished and this is irrespective of whatever be the outcome of the proceedings in which the false evidence was given”.
[20-180] Other corruption and bribery offences: Pt 4A Crimes Act 1900; s 200 Police Act 1990; common law bribery
Part 4A Crimes Act 1900
Part 4A provides offences for corruptly receiving commissions or rewards, and other corrupt conduct.
In Retsos v R  NSWCCA 85 at , Sully J (with Simpson and Howie JJ agreeing) said that: “Any offence of, or ancillary to, corrupt conduct on the part of any public official should be denounced plainly and punished condignly”.
In R v Potter  NSWCCA 26, the applicant pleaded guilty to five counts of corruptly receiving a benefit under s 249B(1)(a) as the Chief Steward of the Greyhound Racing Control Board. The sentencing judge properly took into account the historical background that the applicant had engaged in corrupt conduct for at least seven years, although he had been convicted of only five offences. It was permissible to use the applicant’s course of conduct to demonstrate the seriousness of those offences: at . The offences were at the top of the range, based on his official position, the motive of financial gain, the duration of his corrupt conduct, and the number of innocent people affected: at .
Section 200 Police Act 1990 — common law bribery offences
Further offences of bribery and corruption are provided in s 200 Police Act 1990. Under s 200(1), it is an offence for a member of the NSW Police Force to receive or solicit a bribe (pecuniary or otherwise). Under s 200(2), it is an offence for a person to give, offer or promise a bribe to, or make any collusive agreement with, a police officer.
An offence against s 200 is an indictable offence punishable by 200 penalty units, or 7 years imprisonment, or both: s 200(4).
There are also residual common law offences of bribery, conspiracy to bribe a public officer, and conspiracy to receive or solicit a bribe.
In R v Pangallo (1991) 56 A Crim R 441 at 443, Lee J stated that:
In my view, the crime of bribery is always to be regarded as one which strikes at the very heart of the justice system and it must be severely punished whenever it is detected.
In R v O’Mally  NSWCCA 166 at –, Grove J (with Stein AJA and Howie J agreeing) endorsed the following comments in R v Nomchong (unrep, 10/4/1997, NSWCCA): “The police are in a position of authority and trust in the community and the public depends on them to uphold the rule of law. The crime of bribery by a police officer is one that strikes at the very heart of the justice system”. Grove J added, “Those remarks are pertinent to the present offence and not just to an offence higher in the scale of criminality such as was the circumstance in that particular instance.”
In R v Duong (1999) 109 A Crim R 60, Wood CJ at CL (with Foster AJ agreeing) said at :
The offence of bribery or of offering a bribe to police in the course of the execution of their duties is a most serious offence … Save in the most exceptional circumstances it will call for a significant term of imprisonment to be imposed cumulatively or at least substantially cumulatively upon the sentence for the primary offence in respect of the detection or prosecution of which the bribe was offered.
In R v MacLeod  NSWCCA 108 at , the CCA reiterated the serious nature of offences of the kind under s 200, threatening as they do the integrity of the administration of justice and potentially posing danger to police sources of information and jeopardising important investigations.
The failure of an attempted bribery may not be a mitigating factor: R v Duong at . The fact that an attempted bribery was made is more significant than in other attempts to commit substantive offences: R v Duong at ; R v Taouk (1992) 65 A Crim R 387. The likely outcome of an attempted bribery, if it had been successful, may be an aggravating factor. In R v Duong, Wood CJ at CL explained at :
Here we have an offence which, had the attempt succeeded, two results would have followed: first, two police would have been corrupted; second, no less than $8,000,000 worth of heroin would have found its way on to the streets of Sydney with the horrific social consequences which would flow from that release.
These matters, and particularly the second of them, in my view place this attempt to bribe police squarely within the category of the worst type of case.
[20-190] Common law offence of misconduct in public office
The common law offence of misconduct in public office provides that it is an offence for a public official, in the course of or connected to his or her public offence, to wilfully misconduct himself or herself by act or omission without reasonable excuse or justification, where such misconduct is serious and meriting criminal punishment having regard to the responsibilities of the office and the officeholder, the importance of the public objects which they serve and the nature and extent of the departure from those objects: R v Quach (2010) 27 VR 310 at ; Obeid v R  NSWCCA 309 at ; Shum Kwok Sher v HKSAR (2002) 5 HKCFAR 381 per Sir Anthony Mason NPJ.
The offence extends to politicians, such as a member of the NSW Legislative Council: Obeid v R (2015) 91 NSWLR 226 at –. Members of Parliament are entrusted with certain powers and discretions on behalf of the community, and they must be free to exercise those powers and discretions in the public interest, unfettered by considerations of personal gain or profit: Horne v Barber (1920) 27 CLR 494 per Rich J. The system of government expects, and depends on, individual Ministers to do the right thing: R v Macdonald  NSWSC 638 at .
As a common law offence, the penalty for misconduct in public office is at large. In such instances it is the practice of the court to adopt an analogous or corresponding statutory offence, where available, as a reference point for the imposition of penalty: Blackstock v R  NSWCCA 172 at ; citing R v Hokin (1922) 22 SR (NSW) 280. However, the courts have emphasised that the statutory analogue is a point of reference only; it does not establish a kind of de facto maximum: Blackstock v R at ; Jansen v R  NSWCCA 301 at .
The penalty for an offence of being an accessory before the fact to misconduct in public office is also at large, as an accessory before the fact is liable to the same punishment as the principal offender: s 346 Crimes Act 1900. The same approach of sentencing having regard to a statutory reference point, as set out in R v Hokin, may be applied: Jaturawong v R  NSWCCA 168 at . The misconduct in Jaturawong v R involved the offender corruptly receiving payments whilst acting as the manager of a registry of the RTA. Both the offender and the Crown accepted that the relevant reference point was Pt 4A Crimes Act which provides for offences of corruptly receiving commissions and other corrupt practices which carried a maximum penalty of 7 years imprisonment: Jaturawong v R at .
Assessing objective seriousness
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Seeing that Jeannie Pakula and Jessica Phillips wrote that this is "unclear" to them, it's quite straight forward. And as they knew about the investigations you'd imagine their Michael McGarvie wouldn't tell the Opposition Mininster for Police & counter terrorism that they knew nuffin. How much knowledge is needed for the Racketeering laws to apply to foreign officials?
Former CBA and ServiceMesh executives charged with fraud in the US
The former head of ServiceMesh has been charged with bribing executives at the Commonwealth Bank of Australia in order to win a $98 million incentive bonus.
By Asha McLean | September 29, 2017 -- 00:28 GMT (10:28 AEST) | Topic: Legal
A federal grand jury in Los Angeles indicted former head of Southern California software company ServiceMesh Eric Pulier on Wednesday, along with a former IT manager for the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA).
The charges include securities fraud and conspiracy, with Pulier alleged to have bribed CBA executives in order to win a $98 million incentive bonus. Authorities also say Pulier paid about $2.5 million in bribes to the IT manager Joe Waldron and another bank executive Keith Hunter to obtain bank contracts for his company.
Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) entered into an arrangement with ServiceMesh back in 2013, which saw the Pulier-led firm purchased on the basis of its profits.
The deals between Waldron and Hunter at the bank pushed up company revenues and triggered the $98 million incentive payout. The total sale price of ServiceMesh to CSC was $260 million, which comprised $93 million in cash and an earnout payment of $98 million, given to ServiceMesh owners. Authorities say Pulier's cut was about $30 million.
Arrest warrants were issued for Waldron and Pulier, after Hunter agreed to settle charges in September 2016.
A spokesperson for Pulier told ZDNet the evidence will prove he is being wrongly accused.
"Eric Pulier has been wrongly accused of crimes he did not commit. The evidence will show that Mr Pulier did not bribe anyone for contracts to increase the earn-out payment to ServiceMesh shareholders," the spokesperson said.
"To the contrary, the contracts ServiceMesh signed with the Commonwealth Bank of Australia in 2013 and 2014 were legitimate."
The spokesperson said CSC touted ServiceMesh's work for CBA as a "success story", even after allegations were made about bribery.
"Indeed, far from being defrauded in its acquisition of ServiceMesh, CSC's CEO publicly acknowledged that the ServiceMesh acquisition 'really paid off' for CSC," the spokesperson added. "We are confident that Mr. Pulier will be vindicated."
Hunter is currently serving a three-and-a-half-year gaol sentence handed down to him in December from a district court in Sydney.
The former executive general manager of Infrastructure and Operations was sentenced after pleading guilty to two counts of bribery for a parallel case in early 2016.
The first offence related to causing a financial disadvantage to his employer by deception, which saw CBA spending AU$6.65 million on software and other IT-related services -- later found by Ernst & Young that the bank did not actually need.
With a maximum delegation of AU$1 million, Hunter split the AU$6.65 million purchase up into seven separate transactions and did not undertake any proper procurement procedures before transacting with ServiceMesh.
The second offence related to Hunter, on an annual salary at CBA in excess of AU$1 million, agreeing to receive financial remuneration of $300,000 by showing favour to ServiceMesh.
CBA, by way of Hunter, purchased McAfee security products from ServiceMesh despite using Hewlett-Packard for its McAfee applications in the past.
On the first count, Hunter received a non-parole sentence of one year, nine months, with an additional one year and three months. On the second count, Hunter received a fixed term of 12 months.
This totals three years, six months, with an overall non parole period of two years, three months.
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The SEC was aware of Shirley joseph's role in the board's plans "to violate the Economic Espionage Act 1996" . Some of the economic evidence is here
Elliot Sgargetta-Waldron's statement at the SEC Whistleblowers clearly says the criminal narcotics ring that passed Reserve Bank information ended up costing American Express billions. Michael McGarvie claimed to his Opposition Minister for Counterterrorism and Police Robert Clark that McGarvie and Bowles knew nothing, however their brief is dated August 4th 2015 which because of tmezones is day before Garaufis ripped the Settlement up. Sgargetta Snr says McGarvie's whistleblowers were scared , ie they knew all about it and you'd think that carrying out plans to cover up might be unethical if not Racketeering or something.
There's a hearing in the US Supreme Court on 26 Feb 2018.
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FinCen's helpline contact details are here www.fincen.gov/news-room/enforcement-actions and the Australian newspaper say Fincen has 511 pages two years ago. McGarvie's letter dated 4 August 2015 even refers to the first victim of Fincen's elliot ness squad, Al Capone.
looks like McGarvie and Gadens Ms Minassian don't like Fincen Geoffrey Graber's thinking or Racketeering laws on cabals of foreign officials and bankers and lawyers.
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The Pink Batts Green Loans scandal arises from .... a filing cabinet full of Cabinet's secrets.
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